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Notwithstanding the civil nature of Utah's
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must the Miranda warning be given prior to custodial interrogation
re a breath test before a refusal may be admitted into evidence
at trial for the criminal charge of drunk driving?
6.

By analogy, applying Hansen, supra, if the
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drunk driving?
This issue is presently before this court in the pending
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case of Sandy City v. Lloyd E. Larson, No. 19754, appeal filed
February 14, 1984, and was recognized in Lloyd E. Larson v. Fred
Schwendiman, No. 20186, decided December 12, 1985, 24 Utah Adv.
Rep. 19.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a drunk driving case.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The appellant was accused by an Amended Information,
deleting the . 087o provision, for having committed the offense of
Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §41-6-44(a).
A non-jury trial in absentia was held March 7, 1985,
before the Honorable K. Roger Bean, Judge of the Fourth Circuit
Court, Layton Department, Davis County, State of Utah, Case No.
84-TF-669.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS
March 7, 1985, the appellant was found guilty of the
above offense.
April 17, 1985, the appellant was sentenced for the
above offense.

The sentence was stayed for seven (7) days pending

appeal to the district court.
April 22, 1985, the appellant timely filed in the
circuit court his Notice of Appeal and his $600.00 Appeal Bond,
which his sureties had executed April 18, 1985.
-2-

April 3 0 , 1985, the appellant filed his Designation of
Record.

T h e entire recnr
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4929.
August 23, 1985, the district; court affirmed the circuit
court,

A copy of Lhe d u U i c L

C U U I L ' •> h u h i u

included in the Addendum to this brief.

iin \ppeai

i : in-

(Addendum, p. 2 1 )

September 1 9, 1985, the appellant timely filed his
N o t i c e of Appeal and Designation of Record f o r h i s appeal to this
court.
;;TAIF;?IE?II OF RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIFVJ

It w a s stipulated and permitted thac the prosecution
could make a proffer of proof for its version of the facts of the
case and that the delense would huvc .in oppurtui li ty to state for
the record his positions and m o t i o n s . (T.3)
The lower court agreed that after the respondent h a d made
its proffer of p r o o f , the appellant.''i ,u fj-niey C"i:ld I T J S S

examine

the arresting officer relative to the constitutional aspects of
the f i el d sc )bi:i et:\ tests

(1. 4)

Respondent's Proffer of Proof
While traveling in opposite directions on 1-15 in Davis
-3-

County at about 3:10 a.m., July 10, 1984, the arresting officer
checked the appellant through radar as speeding 68 mph.

(T.4)

After turning around, it took the arresting officer
approximately two miles to catch up to the appellant's vehicle, (T.5
Following that, the arresting officer saw two lane
changes twice, left wheels drove over the lane divider and a
third time, the left wheel completely crossed over the lane
divider without signalling.

(T.5)

The vehicle was stopped at that time.
was an odor of alcohol on the appellant's breath.

(T.5) There
(T.5) The

arresting officer asked the appellant how much he had had to
drink.

He indicated a couple of beers.

(T.5)

The arresting officer asked the appellant to submit to
tests.

(T.5)

The appellant replied, "I will."

Miranda warning was given prior to that.

(T.5) No

(T.6)

The arresting officer gave the appellant three field
sobriety tests.

(T.6)

Following field sobriety tests, the appellant was
placed under arrest.

(T.7)
Appellant's Cross Examination

The appellant was not arrested for speeding 68 mph.
(T.16)
The appellant was not arrested for changing lanes (T.16)
wihout signalling. (Ta5)
The arresting officer did not form an opinion that the
-4-

appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol merely by
his speeding or changing of lanes. (T.17)
The appellant was Mformallyff placed under arrest for
driving while under the influence of alcohol (T.10), after the
arresting officer had smelled the odor of alcohol on the appellant's
breath (T.17), after he had given him the field sobriety tests
(To 10 and T Q 17), and before he had given him the Miranda warning.
Before the appellant was uformally,f arrested (T. 10) ,
he was detained by the arresting officer at the time that he
stopped him. (T.10)
Although the arresting officer did not feel the appellant
was in custody, he did not give him the opportunity to
leave the scene. (T.10)

He would have stopped him if he had

just kept going. (T.10)

Once he had stopped him, he would not

have let him drive away on his free will. (T.10)
The appellant did not have his freedom to leave. (T.10)
The arresting officer was asked,

lf

Uhether we call it

'detention1 or 'custody, 'loss of freedom,1 'arrest' or 'whatever,1
you agree, don't you, that he was not free to go without your
attempting to stop him?"

(T.10)

The arresting officer answered, "Yes, I do.1' (T.ll)
It was after that, and before the Miranda warning was
given, that the appellant made statements to the arresting officer,
and they talked back and forth.

(T.ll)

At no time, prior to having conversation with him, nor
-5-

prior to having him perform the field sobriety tests, did the
arresting officer advise the appellant of his Miranda rights.
(T.ll)

Nor did he at any time explain to him that there were

constitutional rights in addition to Miranda.

(T.ll and T.12)

The arresting officer never told the appellant that
the Federal Constitution against self-incrimination said that he did
not have to be a "witness against himself.
The arresting officer did not explain to the appellant
the distinction between the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of Utah that says he is not compelled to give any "evidence"
against himself.

(T012)

The arresting officer did not tell the appellant that
he did not have to take the field tests.

(T.12)

The arresting officer did not tell the appellant that
he had a constitutional right not to give any evidence against
himself, which the arresting officer considered field sobriety
tests to be evidence against the appellant.

(T.12)

The arresting officer was asked, "And you do consider
the field tests to be evidence against him, don't you?"
answered, "I consider it as —
picture."

He

it's a component of the entire

(T.12)
The arresting officer was then asked, "Yeah.

And that

that was a part of your judgment in determining that he was under
the influence, wasn't it?"

(T.12)

(T.13)
-6-

He answered, "Yes.

It was."

The appellant requested and was denied his right to
have a lawyer present.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE CASE
The district court specifically found the officer made
a custodial stop at the time he pulled the appellant over relative
to the incident of the evening of the arrest. (Addendum, p. 21 )
This holding established the requirement of Miranda
prior to any interrogation for admissible evidence at the trial
of a criminal charge of drunk driving.

The Miranda warning would

be required as to all interrogation, whether relative to the
field sobriety tests or the breath test.
Furthermore, applying Hansen, supra, the affirmative
acts of the field sobriety tests would be inadmissible at the
trial for the criminal charge of drunk driving, as being in
violation of the appellant's constitutional right against selfincrimination for the reasons stated in Point I of this brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CONSTITUTIONALLY
ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF FIELD
SOBRIETY TESTS AND REFUSAL OF
BREATH TEST.
The appellant moved to suppress the evidence of the
field sobriety tests on constitutional grounds. (T.18)
The lower court denied the appellant's Motion to Suppress
all evidence relating to the field sobriety tests.
-7-

(T.23)

Chiseled in the marble above the front steps of the
United States Supreme Court -- "Equal Justice Under Law" —
glaringly tells the world that what is fair for one is fair for
all in any given situation0
This is the cornerstone of United States Const,,
Amends. V, VI, and XIV:
Amend V provides for the right against
self-incrimination in that an accused
does not have to be a witness against
himself and further provides for due
process of law.
Amend VI provides for the assistance
of counsel.
Amend XIV provides for due process of
law and equal protection of law.
This is also the cornerstone of Utah Const., Art. I,
§§7, 12, and 27:
§7 provides for due process of law.
§12 provides for the assistance of
counsel.
§27 provides for frequent recurrence
to fundamental principles which are
essential to the security of individual rights.
The word "equal" means the same, even, alike, identical
neither inferior nor superior, just, uniform, matched, level,
par, commensurate, balanced, nor more no less, share and share
alike, 6 of one and 1/2 dozen of the other, all for one and one
for all, half and half, as good as, fairness, distinction without
a difference.... (Words and Phrases, Webster's New International

Dictionary, Unabridged Edition, Roget's Thesaurus of English
Words and Phrases, and cases galore from all jurisdictions.)
The purpose of due process and equal protection of law
is to give all persons similarly situated the guaranteed rights
to fair and equal treatment without placing burdens or privileges
on different persons within the same classification exercising
their fundamental rights.
The field sobriety tests violate this purpose.

One of

the most fundamental rights of an accused is the right to a fair
trial.

And the right to a fair trial incorporates the right to

be advised of and to confront the evidence to be used against
the accused,

(Pitchess v. Superior Court, Cal., 522 P.2d 305

(1974).)
In the instant case, the appellant was not advised of
his rights to confront the evidence (field sobriety tests) to be
used against him at trial to entitle him to an intelligent defense
in light of all relevant and accessible evidence.

In fact, the

appellant was not advised that he did not have to take the field
sobriety tests, nor that the results could be used against him as
evidence at trial.

(Ta12)

He was not advised that he had the right to remain silent
once he became a suspect to the criminal offense of driving while
under the influence of alcohol.

He became such a suspect when

the arresting officer smelled the odor of alcohol on the appellant's
breath (T.5 and T.17) and after he had taken the field sobriety
-9-

tests. (T.74 T.10, T.ll, T.17, and T.18)
According to one version of the testimony of the arresting officer, the appellant was a suspect even prior to the above
reasons, i.e., when the arresting officer saw him speeding 68 mph
(T.16), change lanes (T.5, T.16, and T.17), without signalling
(T.5), and his driving pattern. (T.17)
A contrary version of the testimony of the arresting
officer was that he did not form an opinion that the appellant was
driving while under the influence of alcohol at this time merely
from the 68 mph and the change of lanes. (T.17)

If this version

is accepted, the arresting officer had no probable cause to stop
the appellant for driving while under the influence of alcohol.
Consequently, the arrest that followed would have been an illegal
arrest, and the appellant's Motions to Suppress (T.18) and Dismiss
(T.19) should not have been denied (T.23), because all offered
evidence that follows an illegal arrest is illegal and inadmissible.
Under any of these situations, the appellant was indeed
a suspect before he was "formally" arrested.
The word "arrest" is not a classic word of art or
mystery.

There is nothing magic about a "formal" arrest.

I suppose

some think you actually have to say the word before it has a
meaning.

Those who do are attempting to justify themselves by

not having to afford constitutional rights to others, i.e., such,
as in this case, as reading the Miranda warning only after the
exact word is stated0

Otherwise, they would have to hide behind
-10-

the word "investigatory.!f

That is precisely what the respondent

is attempting to do in this case.
The High Court and many, many more hold otherwise.
A person is under constructive arrest, at least, and
in custody if any law enforcement officer deprives another of
his freedom of action in any significant way.

If that person is

to be questioned under those circumstances, there exists custodial
interrogation, which is defined as questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a suspect has been taken into custody
and otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.
(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966).)

(See, also, Salt Lake City v. Carner, Utah, 664 P.2d

1168 (1983), J. Durham, concurring.) Miranda held than an accused
must be advised of certain constitutional rights, one of which is
the right to remain silent during custodial interrogation.
is the right to have his lawyer present.

Another

(U.S. Const., Amend VI.)

Our Utah Supreme Court has refined Miranda even further.
In Holman v. Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 1331 (1979), the Utah Supreme
Court held that a driver, suspected of driving under the influence
of alcohol, is at that point involved in a criminal proceeding and
must be given the Miranda warning. The ruling in Holman was
reaffirmed in Smith v. Cox, Utah, 609 P.2d 1332 (1980).

There it

was held that the defendant had the constitutional right not to
give evidence against himself and must be given the Miranda warning
if his statements are to be admitted in a criminal proceeding
-11-

against him.

The same reasoning would apply to the appellant's

refusal or other conversations relative to the breath test and
the trial for the criminal charge of drunk driving, even more so,
because he had been formally arrested and still refused his
request for counsel.
In this case, the respondent contends that the questioning was investigatory (T.6) only and was done in the way of the
general

inquiry type, and the appellant was not in custody (T.IO)

or under arrest. (T.ll)
necessary0

Therefore, the Miranda warning was not

This contention is contrary to the facts.
Miranda (custodial interrogation) can be understood

more clearly by interpreting an earlier United States Supreme
Court decision.
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 845 S.Ct. 1758,
1758 L.Ed.2d 977 (1364), the Court held that a defendant is entitled
to the assistance of counsel when the interrogation begins to
focus on a particular suspect and that no statement elicited by
the police during the interrogation may be used against him in
a criminal trial.
From the very nature of the offense, a suspected drunk
driver comes within the protection of the principle developed in
Escobedo as soon as he is stopped by the police officer.

At the

point of detention, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime and has begun to focus on that particular
suspect.
-12-

The appellant contends the facts will support that he
was in a custodial interrogation atmosphere at the time he made
the statement he seeks to be suppressed.
On the 10th day of July, 1984, near Antelope Drive in
Layton, Davis County, the arresting officer was traveling southbound on 1-15 (T.8) when he first observed the appellant at 3:00
a.m., according to his police report. (T.8 and T.9)

The appellant

was in a vehicle traveling northbound from the opposite direction
at a fast rate of speed.

Radar checked the speed at 68 mph. (T.4)

The citation shows the date and 3:02 a.m. as the time. (T.9) The
arresting officer testified that 3:02 a.m. was the time the
offense took place. (T.9)

He and a companion paramedic turned

on the vehicle. (T.4) They had to turn around.
approximately two miles to catch up with it.

It took them

Following that, they

saw two lane changes twice, left wheels drove over the lane divider and a third time, the left wheel completely crossed over the
lane divider without signalling.

The vehicle was stopped at that

time (T.,5), and the arresting officer asked (T.5) the appellant
for his driver's license, which was produced with no problem.
The questioning was initiated by the arresting officer. (T.5)
The questioning was pursued by the arresting officer. (T.5) The
appellant indicated a couple of beers. (T.5) The arresting officer
asked the third question by inquiring where the appellant was
going.

(T.5) He replied Salt Lake. (T.5)

The arresting officer

asked the fourth question by requesting the appellant to submit
-13-

to tests.

(T.5) The appellant replied, "I will.11 (T.5) There

was an odor of alcohol on the appellant's breath. (T.5)
The facts established the questioning was initiated by
the law enforcement officer, a deputy sheriff of Davis County.
There was no Miranda warning given prior to that time.
(T.6)

The respondent contended it was not necessary because it was

still investigatory.
The next element to be considered is whether or not
the questioning was custodial.
The arresting officer was asked, "Okay.

Now, when you

stopped him, did you give him any opportunity to leave the scene
if he wanted?

Or did you feel that you had him in custody?"

(T.10)
The arresting officer testified that he did not feel
that the appellant was in custody at that time. (T.10)
asked what would happen if he just kept going.

He was

He said that he

would have been obligated to stop him again to complete his
investigatory purposes. (T.10)

He was then asked, "In other words,

once he was stopped, you wouldn't have let him drive away on his
own free will and done nothing, would you?"
wouldn't/' (T.10)

He replied, "No. I

He was then asked, "So, don't you agree that

you had him in custody?" He replied, "I agree that he was detained
at that time." (T.10)

He was further asked, "Yeah.

words, he did not have his freedom to leave, did he?

In other
Whether we

call it 'detention' or 'custody,' 'loss of freedom,' 'arrest,' or
-14-

'whatever,1 you agree, don't you, that he was not free to go
without your attempting to stop him?M (T.10) He replied, "Yes.
I do.11 (T.ll) He was asked, "And it was after that that he made
statements to you, wasn't it?

In other words, you stopped hin,

you weren't going to let him go, and that's when you started to
question him, and he started talking back to you." He replied,
"Yes, I did." (T.ll)
Until that time, the arresting officer had not given
the appellant the Miranda warning. (T.ll)

In fact, he did not

give him the Miranda warning until he arrested him, which was
after the questioning and after the field sobriety tests. (T.ll)
The arresting officer was asked, "Okay.

Now, did you at

any time, prior to having him perform the field tests, did you at
any time tell him of his Miranda rights?" (T.ll) He replied,
"No.

I didn't," (T.ll)
These facts fulfil all requirements to meet the standards

of the necessity of giving the Miranda warning in this case.
indeed, amounted to custodial interrogation.

This,

(1) The questioning

was initiated by a law enforcement officer, (2) after tne suspect
had been taken into custody, and (3) otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.
Therefore, all statements made by the appellant should
be suppressed and not used against him in any criminal action
arising out of the events in this matter.
Otherwise, he would be deprived of his fundamental rights
-15-

afforded him by the law against self-incrimination, due process,
and equal protection.

United States Const., Amends V and XIV,

and Utah Const., Art. I, §§7 and 12.)
Without the appellant's statement in response to the
arresting officer?s request for field sobriety tests, wherein he
responded, ffI will,11 there would be no basis for the admissibility
of the results of those tests in a criminal action against him.
Nevertheless, even with that statement, the results of
those tests should still be suppressed, because they are in
violation of his same constitutional rights as mentioned above.
(Self-incrimination, Due Process, and Equal Protection.)
On the surface of the simplicity of those two words,
first impressions could convey consent by the appellant and no
coercion by the arresting officer.

But, "It Ain't Necessarily

So.Tf (Porgy and Bess, Gershwin,
Due process boils down to fundamental fairness.

Equal

protection means all of us have the same constitutional rights,
which no one can take from us, unless we voluntarily and knowingly
surrender them.

The words 'Voluntarily11 and "knowingly11 have

legalistic meaning.

Let us now delve deeper as we direct our

thoughts toward our rights against self-incrimination as it applies
to field sobriety tests.
The overwhelming weight of authority holds that a suspect
or an accused cannot be compelled to perform field sobriety tests.
(Salt Lake City v. Carner, Utah, 664 P.2d 1168 (1983), Justice
-16-

Durham's concurring opinion.)
The overwhelming weight of authority holds that field
sobriety tests do no violate a suspect's or an accused's constitutional right against self-incrimination.

(See, e.g., People v.

Ramirez, 199 Colo. 367, 374 n. 8, 609 P.2d 616, 620 n. 8 (1980),
citing cases from nineteen jurisdictions); State v. City of
Tuscon, 12 Ariz. App. 529, 472 P.2d 952 (1970); 3 R. Erwin,
Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal-Civil, §32.02(4) (1982
and Supp. 1982).)
The reasoning for this view is because the constitutional right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial
evidence.

Field sobriety tests are not testimonial evidence.

They are affirmative acts of physical evidence.
U.S. Const., Amend XIV, provides that an accused does
not have to be a \>zitness against himself.

A witness gives testi-

monial evidence.
Within the above overwhelming authority, many states
have the same wording in their constitutions.

Some states have

other wording in their constitutions, but such has been interpreted
to mean the same.
Applying the law at the time of arrest, Utah Const.,
Art. I, §12 provides that an accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself.

Evidence is an all inclusive term.

Although it includes testimonial evidence, it also includes
physical evidence, e.g., documents, properties, acts, etc.
-17-

Notwithstanding interpretations from other jurisdictions, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted its constitution's
provision against self-incrimination as being more inclusive than
limiting it to testimonial evidence, and includes therein affirmative acts which may not be compelled.
619 P.2d 315 (1980).)

(Hansen v. Owens, Utah,

It is recognized that American Fork v.

Cosgrove, Utah, 701 P.2d 1069 (1985) overruled Hansen, supra.
However, it cannot be applied retroactively without doing violenc
to due process and ex post facto concepts.

(U.S. Const., Art. I,

§10.)
Since field sobriety tests may not be compelled, they
constitute affirmative acts which are included as evidence within
the meaning of Utah's constitutional provision against selfincr iminat ion.
Therefore, the appellant had the constitutional right
against self-incrimination relative to the administered field
sobriety tests.
It is recognized that the appellant may voluntarily
and knowingly waive that right and consent to the performance of
field sobriety tests.

However, before the appellant could volun-

tarily and knowingly waive that right, he would have to be proper
advised of that right.
The arresting officer did not tell the appellant that
he had the constitutional right not to give any evidence against
himself. (T.12)

He did not tell him that he was not compelled to
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perform the field sobriety tests. (T.12)
Consequently, the appellant was not properly advised
of his constitutional right against self-incrimination relative
to the evidence of the performed field sobriety tests, notwithstanding his saying, "I will,11 and his performance of the tests.
Therefore, all evidence pertaining to the performed
field sobriety tests in this matter should be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Without evidence of the field sobriety tests, all that
would remain would be opinion evidence relative to the charged
offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol.
The opinion evidence would be limited to (1) 68 mph
(T.4 and T.16), (2) driving pattern (T.5, T.16, and T.17), (3)
speed (T.5 and T.18), and (4) odor of alcohol.
The arresting officer had seen others speed and have
similar driving patterns who were not driving under the influence
of alcohol. (T.17)

The arresting officer did not issue citations

to the appellant for his speeding or driving pattern. (T.16) He
did not know alcohol was involved until he smelled the odor on
the appellantfs breath.

He still did not have an opinion that

the appellant had been driving under the influence until he had the
appellant perform the field sobriety tests, because it was not
until after that that he formally arrested the appellant for
driving while under the influence of alcohol, (T,10)
The judgment of the lower courts should be reversed; or,
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at least, be remanded for a new trial without any evidence pertaining to the field sobriety tests or refusal relative to the
breath test.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The appellant hereby requests oral argument in this
matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

< (~^>- day of March, 1986.

X ^ - ,

(

PHIL L. HANSEN
800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2467
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

U " ^ ''-^day of March, 1986,

four (4) copies of Brief of Appellant were served on the Office
of the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114.

' ( .^A^-\~ V ' *—*-<

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EARL W. EAST,
Defendant.

]
]1
1
]

RULING ON APPEAL
Criminal No. 4929

This appda- came before the court on August 13, 1985, with
Robert B. Hart ;:.cearing for the plaintiff and Phil L. Hansen
appearing for zae defendant. Counsel requested a one week continuance which the court granted. Counsel thereafter requested
a ruling based upon the briefs filed with the court. The court
now rules on the appeal.
The arresting officer in this case stopped the defendant for
speeding. There was also a driving pattern involving two lane
changes without signaling and also the left wheels driving over
the lane divider. The officer could smell an odor of alcohol on
the defendant's breath on approaching him. At this point the officer could have issued the defendant a citation for speeding and
allowed him to _ ~eed on his way. However, he suspected driving
under the infl. •-•r.?a of alcohol. This was a custodial stop.
Obviously the defendant was not free to leave. The defendant urges
the court to require the Miranda warning at this time. Mere suspicion of a traffic off .v.-.se does net require the Miranda warning.
The officer asked the defendant how much he had to drink and he
replied two beers. The officer properly requested the defendant
to take field sobriety tests. The defendant consented. These
tests did not require the officer to advise the defendant of a
right against self-incrimination. The Utah Supreme Court in
American Fork City vs. Crosgrove, 11 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 stated:
" . . . History supports the conclusion, accepted by the vast majority of authorities, that
the commonlaw privilege is limited to testimonial
and communicative evidence only and not to evidence

-2of a real of physical nature such as that obtained
from a breathalyzer test,"
The field sobriety tests are not "testimonial and communicative
evidence."
After the field sobriety tests were given, the officer formally arrested the defendant for DUI and gave him his Miranda
warning-. -This was the appropriate procedure. The Utah Supreme
Court in Holman vs. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (1979) said:
" . . . However, when a driver suspected of driving under the influence is arrested, he is at that point
involved in a criminal proceeding and must be given the
Miranda Warning if his subsequent statements are to be
admitted in a criminal proceeding against him . . . "
The Cox case involved the Driver License Division. The defendant
urges that an arrest takes place when the defendant's free right
of movement is stopped. This is technically correct, but the
Supreme Court has never required the Miranda warning at the point,
On the other hand it has not permitted officers to ask extensive
questions under the guise of custodial investigation. In the
case at hand the officer reasonably suspected DUI after giving
the field sobriety tests. Having arrested the defendant for DUI
it was proper to ask him to take a chemical test.
The defendant's right against self-incrimination was not
violated in this case and the lower court appropriately ruled.
This case is ordered returned to the Layton Department of the
Fourth Circuit Court with directions to execute the sentence.
Dated August 23, 1985.
BY THlT\COURT:

JUDG?
Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy Qf the foregoing Ruling to Robert B. Hart, Davis
County Attorney's Office, Farmington, Utah and to Phil L. Hansen,
800 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on August 26,
1985.
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